The finding that naming responses can be affectively primed suggests (a) that stimulus evaluation does not depend on participants having an explicit evaluative processing goal, and (b) that the perception of an affectively polarized stimulus can result in the preactivation of memory representations of affectively related stimuli. However, in all published studies that demonstrated significant affective priming of naming responses, both the primes and the targets were repeatedly presented. Hence, one cannot rule out the possibility that stimulus repetition is a prerequisite for obtaining affective priming of naming responses. We examined (a) whether affective priming of naming responses can be obtained in the absence of stimulus repetition, and (b) whether affective priming in the naming task is affected by the number of stimulus presentations. Results show that affective priming of naming responses does not depend on stimulus repetition.
In a typical affective priming study (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) , two affectively polarized stimuli are presented on each trial and participants are asked to judge the affective connotation of the second stimulus (i.e., the evaluative categorization task). Whereas the first stimulus (the prime) is presented only for a short period of time (e.g., 200 ms), the second stimulus (i.e., the target) is typically presented until a response is registered. Results show that the time needed to evaluate the target stimuli as either "positive" or "negative" is significantly shorter when the primes and the targets are affectively congruent (positive-positive or negative-negative) as compared to when the primes and the targets are affectively incongruent (positivenegative or negative-positive). This so-called affective priming effect has been found (a) when the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was short (e.g., Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001) , (b) when a secondary memory load task reduced cognitive capacities (e.g., Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000) , and even (c) when the primes were presented subliminally (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998) . Accordingly, it has been argued that stimulus evaluation can occur in a fairly automatic and unconditional fashion (for reviews, see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003) .
Whereas in most affective priming studies participants are instructed to respond on the basis of the valence of the targets, a number of researchers (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Berner & Maier, 2004; De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994; Hermans et al., 2001; Maier, Berner, & Pekrun, 2003; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002 Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandromme, & Eelen, 2007; Wentura & Frings, 2008 ) also obtained significant affective priming effects when using a naming task (i.e., naming the target stimuli). The fact that significant affective priming of naming responses can be obtained is important for two reasons. First, it suggests that stimulus evaluation is not conditional on participants having an explicit evaluative processing goal (Bargh et al., 1996) . Second, it provides crucial evidence about the processes that underlie the affective priming effect. As argued by several authors (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; De Houwer et al., 2001; Gawronski, Deutsch, & Seidel, 2005; Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Musch, Klauer, & Mierke, 2004; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998; Wentura, 1999) , affective priming can be due to processes that operate at an encoding stage as well as to processes that operate at a response selection stage. According to an encoding account of affective priming, affectively polarized prime stimuli preactivate the memory representations of affectively related targets, thus making it easier to encode targets with the same valence as compared to targets with a different valence. Alternatively, according to a response level account of affective priming, affective priming effects result from the fact that the primes (e.g., Klinger et al., 2000) or the prime-target relationship (e.g., Klauer & Musch, 2002) automatically trigger response tendencies that facilitate or interfere with target responding. In the naming task, however, processes operating at a response selection level are unlikely to contribute to the affective priming effect because each target stimulus is linked with a unique response. Hence, the observation that naming responses can be affectively primed suggests that affectively polarized primes preactivate the memory representations of affectively related targets (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer et al., 2001; De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002; Ferguson, Bargh, & Nayak, 2005; Spruyt, 2005; Spruyt et al., 2002 ; see also Bargh, 1997) .
It is important to note, however, that in all the studies that produced significant affective priming of naming responses, both the primes and the targets were repeatedly presented. For example, in Experiment 1 of Bargh et al. (1996) , each prime stimulus and each target stimulus was presented 5 times. As another example, consider Experiment 3 of Spruyt et al. (2002) . In this study, each target stimulus was presented 16 times and each prime stimulus was presented 12 times. This procedural aspect may not be trivial. Repeated presentation of primes and targets is likely to raise the temporal accessibility of their corresponding memory representations (Klauer & Musch, 2001) . Therefore, one cannot rule out the possibility that processes operating at an encoding level come into play only if the memory representations of the presented stimuli are already preactivated to some extent. Moreover, if the same stimuli appear over and over again, participants may be encouraged to rely on conscious strategies (Klauer & Musch, 2001) .
For these reasons, we set up a naming experiment in which participants were presented with four blocks of trials. Within each block, no stimulus appeared more than once, but the same set of stimuli was used in each of the four blocks. That way, we were able to assess (a) whether affective priming of naming responses can be obtained in the absence of stimulus repetition (block 1), and (b) whether affective priming in the naming task increases as the number stimulus presentations increases.
It should be noted that we were not the first to examine these issues. In Experiment 1 of Klauer and Musch (2001) , the prime-set size (10 vs. infinite) and the target-set size (2 vs. 10 vs. infinite) were manipulated orthogonally. As a result, over 120 experimental trials, each target was presented either once, 12 times, or 60 times. Likewise, the primes were presented either once or 10 times (20 trials were neutral control trials consisting of a letter string and a target word). Unfortunately, however, Klauer and Musch failed to obtain significant affective priming effects, irrespective of the prime-set size and the target size. Hence, this study does not allow us to draw any conclusion about whether stimulus repetition is a prerequisite for affective priming of naming responses to occur.
The fact that Klauer and Musch (2001) failed to obtain significant affective priming of naming responses is not an isolated finding. Several naming studies have revealed that it is relatively difficult to obtain significant affective priming of naming responses when words are used as primes as targets and targets (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Hermans, 1996 , Experiment 8, Klauer & Musch, 2001 Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004 ; but see above). In contrast, however, it has been found that the affective priming effect replicates rather easily in the naming task when pictures are used as primes (see Spruyt et al., 2002 , for evidence and theoretical considerations). Accordingly, we decided to use pictures as primes in the present study. In line with the study of Klauer and Musch (2001) , words were used as targets.
Method

Participants and Design
Participants were 46 University of Leuven students (12 men, 34 women). They received course credit for their participation. All participants were native speakers of Dutch and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment consisted of a 4 (block) ϫ 2 (affective congruency) within-subjects design.
Materials
On the basis of the norms of , 20 positive words and 20 negative words were selected as targets (see the Appendix). Positive and negative target words differed significantly from each other on the affective dimension, t(38) ϭ 44.30, p Ͻ .0001, M positive ϭ 6.19 (SD ϭ 0.42), M negative ϭ 1.49 (SD ϭ 0.21). Primes were 30 positive and 30 negative colour pictures (see the Appendix for a description). These pictures (512 pixels wide, 384 pixels high) were selected on the basis of a preliminary rating study in which participants (N ϭ 51) rated the affective connotation of 215 real life colour pictures on a 11-point rating scale ranging from Ϫ5 (very negative) to ϩ 5 (very positive).
1 Positive and negative prime pictures differed significantly from each other on the affective dimension, t(58) ϭ 22.74, p Ͻ .0001, M negative ϭ Ϫ2.77 (SD ϭ 1.04), M positive ϭ 2.22 (SD ϭ 0.61).
All stimuli were presented against the black background of a 19 in. computer monitor (100 Hz, 24 bits per pixel, screen resolution 1024 ϫ 768). An Affect 3.0 programme (Hermans, Clarysse, Baeyens, & Spruyt, 2003) controlled the presentation of the stimuli as well as the registration of the response latencies. The experiment was run on Agnus-based Ericom Personal Computer (Leuven, Belgium) with AMD Athlon 1900 processor (64 MB VRAM). An external voice key that was connected to the parallel port of the computer was used to measure response latencies.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit and soundproof room. They were informed that they were participating in a reaction time experiment and that pairs of words and pictures would be sequentially presented on the computer screen. They were instructed to pronounce the words as quickly as possible whilst ignoring the pictures. In addition, the use of the voice key was explained and demonstrated in detail.
Participants completed four blocks of 40 trials each. For each block, the computer programme assigned the 40 target words randomly to 40 randomly selected prime pictures, the only restriction being that each trial type (positive-positive, positivenegative, negative-positive, negative-negative) would occur equally often. Thus, prime valence and target valence were varied orthogonally and the number of affectively congruent and affectively incongruent trials was balanced (consistency proportion ϭ .50). Prior to the start of the experimental trials, participants were given 10 practise trials. These practise trials consisted of a random combination of 10 neutral prime pictures (e.g., a picture of a key) and 10 neutral target words (e.g., "Circle"). Each practise stimulus was presented exactly once.
1 Some of these pictures originated from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001 ). IAPS numbers: 1030, 1050, 1120, 1201, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1500, 1610, 1750, 1930, 1931, 2070, 2120, 2220, 2565, 2800, 4490, 4611, 4534, 4651, 4672, 4680, 5030, 6250, 6350, 6550, 6560, 7350, 9040. Each trial started with a 500 ms presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen. Five hundred milliseconds after the offset of the fixation cross, the primes were presented for 200 ms. Finally, after an inter stimulus interval of 50 ms, the target stimuli were presented until the participant gave a response or 2,000 ms elapsed. By pressing one of three keys of the computer keyboard, the experimenter coded whether the microphone was triggered accurately and whether the participant's response was correct. After the experimenter entered the code, the next trial was initiated after a time interval that varied randomly between 500 ms and 1,500 ms.
Results
The data from trials on which the voice key was not appropriately activated (2.74%) or an incorrect response was given (0. 52%) were excluded from all analyses. In addition, all response latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant's conditional mean latency (1.70%) were also discarded. Next, for each participant and for each experimental condition, mean response latencies were calculated. Mean response latencies were then subjected to a two-way repeated measures ANOVA (Block ϫ Affective Congruency).
2 Greenhouse-Geisser approximations (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) were applied to compensate for violations of the sphericity assumption.
Both the main effect of block, F(2.50, 112.44) ϭ 8.42, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 439.00; and affective congruency, F(1, 45) ϭ 8.83, p Ͻ .005, MSE ϭ 169.78; reached significance (see Table 1 ). The interaction between both factors was far from significant, F Ͻ 1. Most important, two-sided t tests revealed that the effect of affective congruency was significant in the first block, t(45) ϭ 2.40, p Ͻ .05. In all other blocks, the affective priming effect failed to reach significance (see Table 1 ).
Discussion
The results are clear-cut. Despite the fact that participants never saw the same stimulus more than once within each block, significant affective priming of naming responses emerged in the first block. In addition, we observed that the overall effect of affective congruency was unaffected by stimulus repetition (F Ͻ 1). This pattern of results is important for two reasons. First of all, the observation that naming responses can be affectively primed corroborates the idea that the automatic evaluation of a stimulus can result in the preactivation of affectively related memory representations (see above). In contrast to previous naming studies, however, the present study convincingly demonstrates that stimulus repetition is not a prerequisite to obtain such an effect. We can thus rule out the hypothesis that affective stimulus processing can have an impact on subsequent stimulus encoding only if the memory representations of the stimuli involved are already preactivated by multiple presentations (Klauer & Musch, 2001) . Second, it has been suggested that participants may be encouraged to rely on conscious strategies if stimuli appear over and over again (Klauer & Musch, 2001) . Given that we obtained affective priming despite the fact that stimulus repetition was controlled for, the present findings render such an interpretation unlikely.
Finally, we would like to turn to a somewhat surprising aspect of our data. Even though the effect of affective congruency did not statistically differ across different blocks (F Ͻ 1), a priori contrast revealed that the effect of affective congruency was reliable in the first block only. At present, we can only speculate about the nature of this trend. It should be noted, however, that analogous findings have appeared in the literature. Wong and Root (2003) , for example, found that the impact of masked positive and negative facial pictures on preference judgments of a neutral stimulus diminished rapidly with stimulus repetition. Similar results were reported by Murphy and Zajonc (1993) and Winkielman, Zajonc, and Schwarz (1997) . It could thus be hypothesised that repeated exposure to briefly presented stimuli decreases their effectiveness. Alternatively, research on negative priming (Tipper, 1985) suggests that affective priming may also decrease as a function of target repetition. Consider, for instance, the findings of Malley and Strayer (1995) . They presented participants with pairs of distractor and target words and found negative priming on ignored repetition trials (i.e., the target on trial n is the same as the distractor on trial n-1) to increase with stimulus repetition (see also Strayer & Grison, 1999) . At the same time, however, they found positive priming effects on attended repetition trials (i.e., the target on trial n is the same as the target on trial n-1) to decrease as a function of stimulus repetition. To account for the latter finding, Malley and Strayer (1995) argued that the memory representations of repeated stimuli became activated to an asymptotic degree, thereby obscuring the potential impact of attended repetition probes. Similarly, in the context of affective priming, one might argue that it becomes increasingly more difficult to detect an impact of prime processing on target identification as target representations become increasingly more preactivated by repeated presentations. We would like to emphasise, however, that the present study was primarily designed to test whether stimulus repetition is a prerequisite to obtain affective priming of naming responses. Given that affective priming emerged in the first block, we can safely conclude that affective priming of naming responses does not depend on stimulus repetition. 
Résumé
Le fait que les réponses à une tâche de dénomination puissent être indicées affectivement suggère (a) que l'évaluation du stimulus ne dépend pas du fait que les participants aient un but explicite de traitement évaluatif, et (b) que la perception d'un stimulus affectif polarisé peut avoir comme conséquence la pré activation des représentations mnésiques de stimuli affectifs reliés. Cependant, dans toutes les études publiées ayant rapporté un effet d'indiçage affectif significatif sur la dénomination, les indices et les cibles étaient présentées à plusieurs reprises. Par conséquent, on ne peut pas éliminir la possibilité que la répétition des stimlui soit néces-saire pour obtenir l'effet l'indiçage affectif sur la dénomination. Nous avons examiné (a) si l'indiçage affectif à la tâche de dénom-ination peut être obtenu en l'absence de la répetition des stimuli, et (b) si l'indiçage affectif dans la tâche de dénomination est affecté par le nombre de présentations des stimuli. Les résultats indiquent que l'indiçae affectif des réposes à la tâche de dénomination ne dépend pas de la répetition des stimuli.
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